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ABSTRACT

The Patent Act of 1952 codified liability for active inducement
of infringement and contributory infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271.
The patent law doctrines of active inducement of infringement and
contributory infringement had developed out of a line of cases in the
nineteenth century, but the United States Supreme Court eventually
ruled that they conflicted with the doctrine of patent misuse. The
enactment of § 271 overruled the Supreme Court's decisions that the
defense of patent misuse prevailed over the doctrines of active
inducement of infringement and contributory infringement. The
Senate Report that accompanied the legislation indicated that active
inducement of infringement was broader than contributory
infringement and that contributory infringement was intended to
cover the most common circumstance. The Sony and Grokster
decisions make this history relevant to the indirect infringement of
copyrights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the historical development of the doctrines
of contributory infringement and inducement of infringement in
patent law. This history has a number of interesting twists and turns.
Contributory infringement originated in case law as a way to enable a
patentee to enforce a patent when it was being infringed by a large
number of persons whom it was impractical to sue together. The
doctrine of contributory infringement permitted the patentee to sue an
entity that had instigated the collective infringement either by selling
a product that had no use other than to infringe the patent, or using
other means to encourage infringement, such as providing instructions
on how to infringe the patent.
Shortly after the doctrine of contributory infringement developed
in the courts, some patentees found ways to use it to extend their
patent monopolies beyond the scope of their patents. This was
accomplished primarily through the use of tying arrangements, which
required purchasers of patented products to also purchase unpatented
goods. Congress responded by enacting a special antitrust law, the
Clayton Act, which included prohibiting the use of tying
arrangements to create a monopoly in unpatented goods.' In addition,
the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of patent misuse to bar a
patentee from extending a patent monopoly beyond the scope of the
2
patent.
The doctrine of patent misuse expanded rapidly until in a
remarkable pair of decisions the Supreme Court ruled that the patent
misuse doctrine trumped the doctrine of contributory infringement
and generally barred patentees from obtaining relief for contributory
infringement. 3 In response to the Supreme Court's decisions,
4
Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271 as part of the Patent Act of 1952.
Section 271 codified the case law doctrine of contributory
infringement in paragraphs (b) and (c) and also restricted the patent
misuse doctrine in paragraph (d) so as not to interfere with proper
uses of the doctrine of contributory infringement. Recently, the
Supreme Court has extended the patent law doctrines of contributory

1. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
2. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
3. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
4. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792-814 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ I290 (2000)).
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infringement and inducement of infringement in paragraphs (b) and
5
(c) of § 271 to copyright law.
Section II of this Article traces the development of the doctrine
of contributory infringement in the early federal cases. Section III
describes how the doctrine of contributory infringement was used
with tying arrangements and how this use led to the enactment of the
Clayton Act. Section IV outlines the development of the doctrine of
patent misuse and how it eventually undermined the doctrine of
contributory infringement. Section V describes the enactment of 35
U.S.C. § 271 to codify the doctrine of contributory infringement.
Section VI examines a number of cases decided by the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that have
interpreted § 271. Finally, Section VII discusses the Supreme Court
cases that have extended § 271 to copyright law.
II. ORIGINS OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT

Picture of Lamp in Wallace Case

Wallace v. Holmes,6 decided in 1871, was the first case to

recognize a claim for contributory infringement. The patent was for
5. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
6. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v.
Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1896) (identifying Wallace, 29 F. Cas.
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an oil lamp that included a burner and a glass chimney on top of the
burner to keep the flame from being blown out. The particular
improvement was a mechanism for attaching the chimney to the
burner so that the bottom part of the chimney remained cool; but the
patent claims included the combination of the burner and the glass
chimney. The defendants in the Wallace case manufactured and sold
burners that were substantially the same as the burner in the patented
invention, except that the defendants never manufactured or sold any
chimneys along with the burners. The Circuit Court recognized the
general rule that there is no infringement of a combination patent
unless all of its elements are made or used, but it ruled that the
defendants had infringed the patent:
If, in actual concert with a third party, with a view to the actual
production of the patented improvement in lamps, and the sale and
use thereof, they consented to manufacture the burner, and such
other party to make the chimney, and, in such concert, they
actually make and sell the burner, and he the chimney, each utterly
useless without the other, and each intended to be used, and
actually sold to be used, with the other, it cannot be doubtful, that
they must be deemed to be joint infringers of the complainants'
patent. 7
The court decided that it was a "certain inference from the nature of
the case" that the defendants acted in concert with the users of the
lamp to infringe the patent, because the burners that the defendants
sold had no use except when combined with the chimneys.
Although the Wallace decision did not use the term
"contributory infringement," '8 it established the framework for the
doctrine of contributory infringement that was codified eighty years
later in 35 U.S.C. § 271. The Wallace court imposed liability because
of the defendants' joint participation in the infringement of the patent.
There was no direct showing of the defendants' participation in the
infringement other than their sale of a component for the patented
invention, but the court decided that the defendants must have
intended to cause infringement because the component that the
defendants manufactured and sold had no use except to infringe the
patent.

74, as the earliest case in the United States upon the subject of contributory infringement).
7. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80.
8. The first case to use the term "contributory infringement" was Snyder v. Bunnell, 29
F. 47 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (referring to Wallace as perhaps the "clearest illustration" of the
doctrine).
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The Wallace decision was distinguished in the 1886 case of
Snyder v. Bunnell.9 The plaintiff had a patent for an improvement in
an electromagnetic burglar alarm that caused the alarm to continue to
sound after the break in the circuit that activated the alarm (such as
the opening of a door or window) was closed. The defendants
manufactured and sold a device called an "automatic drop" that
concededly might have been used with other devices to infringe the
patent, but also had noninfringing uses. There was no evidence,
however, that the defendants had sold an automatic drop knowing that
it was to be used to infringe the patent, or even that an automatic drop
had ever been combined with other devices to infringe the patent. The
court stated that the defendants would have been liable for
contributory infringement if they had put a product on the market that
"of necessity, to their knowledge" was to be used for infringing the
patent. 10 The court decided, though, that the evidence did not support
such a conclusion, and that if the defendants were liable for selling an
automatic drop, they might be equally liable for the sale of a galvanic
battery or an electric bell, which were also necessary components in
the patented invention. The court found that the doctrine from the
Wallace case did not apply, because the defendants in Wallace knew
that their burners could not be used without infringing the patent. The
court concluded that "holding a party liable as an infringer solely
because an article sold by him might be used by the purchaser as one
element of a patented combination.., would be too dangerous to be
upheld.""1
The case law also recognized that proof of direct infringement
was required in order to impose liability on a defendant for
contributory infringement. For example, in Saxe v. Hammond, 12 the
defendant manufactured wooden fans that it sold to manufacturers of
organs and other musical instruments. Although the defendant's
wooden fans might have been used by the organ manufacturers to
infringe the plaintiffs patent (which was for an attachment to a
musical instrument that made it produce a continuous tremulous note,
instead of a succession of notes), there was no proof that the
defendant had sold any wooden fans to an organ manufacturer who
was not licensed to use the patent. The court held that the defendant
was not liable for contributory infringement because there had been

9.
10.
11.
12.

29 F. 47 (C.D.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
Id.at48.
Id.
21 F. Cas. 593 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 12,411).

374 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
no showing that the defendant's sales had caused the patent to be
infringed. 13

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court held in Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapper Paper Co.,14 that there
was no contributory infringement of a patent for the combination of a
fixture for holding rolls of toilet paper and a roll of toilet paper on
account of the defendant's sale of toilet paper rolls (which were not
themselves patented) to purchasers of the fixtures. The Supreme
Court distinguished Wallace and other contributory infringement
cases on the grounds that the toilet paper should not be treated as an
element of the combination patent, because it had to be replaced
periodically and the patentee did not have the exclusive right to sell
toilet paper to purchasers of the patented fixtures. 15 Without direct
infringement by the toilet paper purchasers, there could be no
contributory infringement by the defendant for supplying the toilet
paper rolls to them.
The Supreme Court distinguished the Morgan Envelope case and
upheld a finding of contributory infringement in Leeds & Catlin v.
Victor Talking Machine Co. 16 The Victor Talking Machine Company
had a patent on a gramophone that included a method claim for
reproducing sounds from a record and stylus and a claim for a sound
reproducing apparatus consisting of a record and a stylus. 17 The
Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of disc records that were
used in the gramophone was liable for contributory infringement of
the patent for the gramophone. The Court reasoned that the disc
records differed from the toilet paper rolls in the Morgan Envelope
case, because the disc records were not perishable and consumed in
the operation of the invention. 18 In addition, the distinctive feature of
the invention was the joint action of the disc and stylus, which
operated together to make the gramophone work. 19
The Morgan Envelope case was an example of a patentee's
attempting to use the contributory infringement doctrine to extend a
patent beyond its proper scope in order to comer a market for supplies
that were used in the operation of the patented invention. It was

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 594.
See 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
Id. at433,
213 U.S. 325 (1909).
U.S. Patent No. 534,543 claims 5, 35 (filed Mar. 30, 1892) (issued Feb. 19, 1895).
Leeds, 213 U.S. at 335.
Id.
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analogous to an attempt by the patentee in the Wallace case to extend
its monopoly to cover glass chimneys, rather than the burner that was
the distinctive feature of the patent. The Victor Talking Machine case,
in contrast, was more analogous to the enforcement of the Wallace
patent against the manufacturers and sellers of the burners.
In many of the early cases, liability for contributory infringement
was based on the manufacture of products that had no noninfringing
uses. 20 There was also a second branch of the doctrine of contributory
infringement, though, in which liability for contributory infringement
was based on other evidence that the defendant intended to cause
infringement. For example, in Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
Precise Mfg. Corp.,21 the defendants were found liable for
contributory infringement for manufacturing and selling transformers
and condensers that could be used to infringe the plaintiffs patents
for superheterodyne radio receivers. Though the components sold also
had noninfringing uses, the defendants advertised that they were
perfect for superheterodyne reception. The cartons in which they were
sold contained directions for using the components to construct
superheterodyne receivers that would infringe the plaintiffs patents.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was little doubt
that the defendants manufactured and sold their products to the public
with the intent that their products would be used to build infringing
radio receivers. The court held:
Many valuable patents are combinations of unpatentable
elements. By furnishing parts it makes it possible for others to
assemble and use the combination, and when a manufacturer, by so
manufacturing and advertising, points out the way in which this
can be done, and thus, intentionally so acting, promote [sic]
infringements of patentee's rights, he becomes a contributory
infringer. A device capable of an infringing use, and sold with the
intent that it shall be so used, is an infringement of the patent, even
though the same device is capable of a noninfringing use, and even
though there may be a form of instructions that it shall be used in a
noninfringing way. But where, as here, it appears that each of the
appellants manufactured with knowledge of the contemplated
22
infringement, contributory infringement is clear.
There was some uncertainty in the early cases as to what was
required for a defendant to be liable for contributory infringement.
20.
1897).
21.
22.

See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir.
11 F.2d209(2dCir. 1926).
Id. at 211-12 (citations omitted).
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The Westinghouse court inferred an intent to cause infringement from
the defendant's advertising and instructions. The last sentence in the
above quotation however, suggests that mere knowledge of a
contemplated infringement by another person was sufficient for a
finding of contributory infringement. Moreover, in Baldwin Rubber
Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the defendant was a contributory infringer because "it had
knowledge that the part assembled by it was to be used in the
completed combination. '2 3 It was not clear, however, whether the
court was permitting the defendant's intent to cause infringement to
be inferred from its knowledge of the contemplated infringement, or
was basing liability for contributory infringement on knowledge
alone. In contrast, in Chas. H. Lilly Co. v. I. F. Laucks, Inc.,24 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it must be affirmatively
shown that a defendant furnishing a component to an infringer did so
with the intent and purpose that it would be used to infringe a patent
in order for the defendant to be liable for infringement. The Ninth
Circuit also decided that a defendant had no duty to ascertain whether
a purchaser of its products was using them to infringe a patent or for
25
some other purpose.
Soon after courts recognized the doctrine of contributory
infringement, ingenious patentees attempted to use the newly
developed doctrine in conjunction with tying arrangements to
leverage their exclusive patent rights beyond the scope of their patents
to cover materials and supplies that were used in the operation of their
patented inventions. These attempts are discussed in the next section.
III. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT

By the end of the nineteenth century, patentees had begun to use
the contributory infringement doctrine to enforce tying arrangements
for products associated with their inventions. The first case that
upheld the use of tying arrangements to extend a patentee's exclusive
rights to unpatented supplies was the Sixth Circuit's 1896 decision in

23. Baldwin Rubber Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., 99 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1938) (emphasis
added). See also Elevator Appliance Co. v. Brooks, 101 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1939) ("Before
one can be held for contributory infingement... he must know the element he sells will be
used in the patented combination or the element must be adapted for no other use.").
24. 68 F.2d 175, 185 (9th Cir. 1933).
25. Id.at 188. See also Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 740 (2d Cir.
1924) (refusing to impose duty on seller of paper cups to ascertain whether the purchaser would
use them for purposes of infringing a patent).
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Heaton-PeninsularButton-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. 2 6
The patentee had several patents for inventions relating to the
fastening of buttons to shoes with metallic fasteners. These patents
were embodied in a machine that the patentee sold along with
unpatented staples that were used in the machine's operation.
Attached to each machine was a metal label that stated that its sale
was subject to the condition that its purchaser would buy and use only
staples that were made by the patentee and that title to the machine
would immediately revert to the patentee upon violation of this
condition. The patentee brought a contributory infringement action
against other companies that made and sold staples to purchasers of
the machines.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the tying
arrangement for the staples was enforceable against the purchasers of
the machine, because a patentee could make a license subject to any
conditions that the patentee wanted and a violation of these could
subject a licensor to a claim for patent infringement.2 7 The court also
found that the sellers of the staples could be found liable for
contributory infringement. It distinguished the Morgan Envelope
case, because the purchasers of the button-fastener machines had
expressly agreed that their rights to use the machines did not extend
beyond their use with staples supplied by the patentee. 28 Thus, the
patentee in the Button-Fastener case was able to use a tying
arrangement to extend its exclusive patent rights on a button-fastener
machine to the unpatented staples that the machine needed to operate,
and then use the contributory infringement doctrine to enforce its
rights under the tying arrangement against the suppliers of staples.
The Button-Fastener decision led to widespread use of tying
arrangements to extend patent monopolies. 29 In the 1912 case of
Henry v. A. B. Dick,30 the Supreme Court upheld the use of a license
26. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (Button-Fastener). See Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co. (Motion Pictures), 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917) (noting that the ButtonFastener case was believed to have originated the construction of the patent laws that upheld
restrictions in tying arrangements on the use of unpatented supplies for patented machines).
27. Button-Fastener,77 F. at 292.
28. Compare Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894) with
Button-Fastener,77 F. at 300.
29. See Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. at 515 (1917).
Other cases in which tying
arrangements to patented inventions were upheld include: Rupp & Wittenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131
F. 730 (6th Cir. 1904); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. The Fair, 123 F. 424 (7th Cir. 1903);
Cortelyou v. Lowe, 111 F. 1005 (2d Cit. 1901); Edison Phonograph Co. v. Pike, 116 F. 863
(C.C.D. Mass. 1902); Tubular Rivet & Stud Co., 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).
30. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruledby Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. at 515.
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restriction that required purchasers of a patented mimeograph
machine to use only stencil paper, ink, and other supplies made by the
patentee. The Court also ruled that the sale of a can of ink to a
purchaser of the mimeograph machine would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent, if the seller had knowledge of the
patentee's license restriction and expected the ink to be used in the
31
mimeograph machine.
The legal landscape was changing during the same period that
the doctrine of contributory infringement was developing, however.
The Sherman Act of 1890 declared "[e]very contract ...in restraint

of trade... to be illegal." '32 The ink supplier in the A.B. Dick case had
argued that the license restriction violated the Sherman Act, but the
Supreme Court decided that the license restriction was reasonable.
The Court reasoned that because the patentee had the right to suppress
the patent entirely, it therefore could impose any condition it wished
on the sale of its patented invention. 33 In 1914, Congress passed the
Clayton Act, which made it unlawful:
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods .... whether

patented or unpatented,... on the condition.., that the...
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ...of a
competitor... , where the effect of such... condition. .. may be

to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce. 34
The Senate debates on the Clayton Act included a discussion of the
Button-Fastener and A.B. Dick cases, which were referred to in the
35
Congressional Record as illustrations of the need for the legislation.
In 1917, the Supreme Court overruled the A.B. Dick case in
Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 3 6
The Motion Pictures Patents Company was formed in 1909 by movie
producers and manufacturers of movie projectors for the purpose of
controlling the movie industry. It represented the most audacious
attempt yet to use a tying arrangement in conjunction with the
doctrine of contributory infringement to enlarge exclusive patent
rights beyond the scope of a patent. At the time, movie projectors
were subject to a number of patents, including a fundamental one by

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

224 U.S. at 49.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
224 U.S. at 31-32.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000) (emphasis added).
51 CONG. REC. 14091-92 (statement of Sen. Reed).
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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Thomas Edison. In order to avoid expensive patent litigation, the
movie producers and projector manufacturers transferred all their
patents into the new company and agreed that the company would
grant patent licenses only to the projector manufacturers who had
formed the company. 37 Attached to each projector that the
manufacturers sold was a plate containing the restriction that the
projector could be used solely with motion pictures produced by the
movie producers that had formed the company.
When a movie theater used a projector that had been purchased
from one of the manufacturers to show a film made by an independent
producer, the company sued both the movie theater and the
independent producer for patent infringement. 3 8 Overruling the A.B.
Dick case, the Supreme Court declared that the exclusive rights
granted in a patent were limited to the patent claims. The Court also
ruled that it was improper for a patentee to extend these rights by
restricting the materials that could be used in the operation of the
patented invention if the materials were not themselves part of the
invention. 39 The Court stated that its conclusion was confirmed by the
passage of the Clayton Act after the A.B. Dick case, but that it was
unnecessary for it to apply the Clayton Act to the case before it, other
than to note that its conclusion was consistent with the expression of
40
public policy by Congress in the Clayton Act.
The Motion Pictures case rejected the use of tying arrangements
to extend exclusive patent rights beyond the scope of a patent.
Subsequent cases went further and developed the defense of patent
misuse to overcome attempts to extend exclusive patent rights beyond
the scope of a patent, even without the use of tying arrangements. The
origins of the defense of patent misuse and its eventual superseding of
the doctrine of contributory infringement are discussed in the next
section.
IV.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AND

PATENT MISUSE

The defense of patent misuse originated in the 1931 case of
41
Carbice Corp. of America v. American PatentsDevelopment Corp.

37.

The background of the Motion Pictures case is described in IX PHILLIP E. AREEDA,

ANTITRUST LAW

38.
39.
40.
41.

1701 b (1991).

Motion Pictures,243 U.S. at 506-08.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 517.
283U.S.27(1931).

380 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. I.J. [Vol. 22
The plaintiff manufactured dry ice, which it sold to its customers with
a notice that they were not permitted to use the dry ice except in
containers that were covered by its patent for a transportation
package. The patented transportation package consisted of a casing of
insulating material that surrounded a container of dry ice and a
freezable product such as ice cream. The defendant was a competing
manufacturer of dry ice that was charged with contributory
infringement because it sold dry ice to the plaintiffs customers with
the knowledge that they would use it in the patented transportation
packages.
The Supreme Court ruled that the injunctive relief sought by the
plaintiff was indistinguishable from the relief that was denied in the
Motion Pictures case, because the plaintiff was seeking to extend the
scope of its patent for a transportation package to cover the dry ice
used in its operation. The Court articulated its holding as follows:
"Relief is denied because the Dry Ice Corporation is attempting,
without sanction of law, to employ the patent to secure a limited
monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the invention. '42
The Supreme Court might have first determined that there was
no direct infringement by the plaintiffs customers of the plaintiffs
patent for the transportation package on account of their purchase of
dry ice from the defendant, because dry ice was not an element of the
patented invention. The Court could then have decided that in the
absence of direct infringement by the plaintiffs customers, there
could not have been contributory infringement by the defendant.
Instead of focusing on the conduct of the alleged direct and
contributory infringers, however, the Supreme Court created the
defense of patent misuse, which was based on the patentee's conduct
in attempting to secure a monopoly on unpatented material.
The Court in Carbice went out of its way to recognize the
continued viability of the doctrine of contributory infringement. The
Court distinguished its previous Victor Talking Machine case as "an
ordinary case of contributory infringement," 43 because the Victor
Company was making its profits from the patented invention, rather
than from unpatented supplies that were used in the patented
invention. In contrast, the plaintiff in the Carbice case was seeking to
secure exclusive rights in an unpatented staple commodity, the dry ice
that it manufactured and sold.

42.
43.

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
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The Carbice case was followed in Leitch Manufacturing Co. v.
Barber Co. 44 The plaintiff and defendant in Leitch were competing
manufacturers of bituminous emulsion, an unpatented staple
commodity used in the construction of roads. The plaintiff had a
patent for a method of retarding evaporation during the curing of
concrete for roads using bituminous emulsion. The plaintiff charged
the defendant with contributory infringement of its patent on account
of the defendant's selling bituminous emulsion to a road builder,
knowing that the road builder would use the bituminous emulsion to
infringe the patent. The plaintiff argued that unlike the Motion
Pictures and Carbice cases, it did not use a tying arrangement or
notice to expand its patent monopoly beyond the scope of its patent.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, and broadly held that
"every use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of
unpatented material is prohibited." 45 Once again, though, the
46
Supreme Court distinguished the Victor Talking Machine case.
The patent misuse defense was applied next in Morton Salt Co.
v. G. S. Suppiger Co. 47 The plaintiff and defendant were competing
manufacturers of salt tablets that were used in the food canning
industry. The plaintiff had a patent on a machine for depositing salt
tablets into cans of food, and it charged the defendant with direct
infringement of its patent on account of the defendant's making and
leasing its own salt deposition machines to the canning industry. The
plaintiff argued that the patent misuse defense did not apply, because
it was limited to suits for contributory infringement, but the Supreme
Court rejected this argument. It held that public policy barred the
plaintiff from using its patent on salt deposition machines to restrain
competition in the market for salt tablets, which were unpatented
48
staple commodities used in the patented salt deposition machines.
A companion case, B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,4 9 which was
decided on the same day as the Morton Salt case, involved the sale of
unpatented materials that were used to infringe a method patent. In
the B.B. Chemical case, the owner of a method patent granted licenses
to its customers permitting them to use its patent only with materials
that it furnished to them. The patent owner sought an injunction
44. 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
45. Id.at 463.
46. Id.
47. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
48. Id.at 493-94. The Seventh Circuit had previously reached the same conclusion in
American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207, 212 (7th Cir. 1939).
49. 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
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against a defendant whom it charged not only supplied materials for
use in infringement of the patent but also actively induced its
customers to infringe the patent. The Supreme Court assumed that the
defendant's infringing activity extended beyond the mere sale of the
materials to the patent owner's customers. Nevertheless, it held that
the patent owner's attempt to restrain competition in the sale of
unpatented materials barred it from obtaining an injunction against
the defendant's inducement of infringement. 50
Finally, the Supreme Court used the patent misuse defense to in
effect eradicate the doctrine of contributory infringement in Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-ContinentInvestment Co. 51 The plaintiff had a patent on
a home heating system that had three main elements: a stoker for
feeding fuel to a furnace, a room thermostat for controlling the stoker,
and a combustion stoker switch for preventing the fire in the furnace
from going out when the room thermostat shut off. The plaintiff
charged the defendant with contributory infringement on account of
the defendant's manufacturing and selling combustion stoker switches
for use in the plaintiffs patented home heating system. The Supreme
Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the combustion stoker
switches had no noninfringing uses and that the defendant was indeed
a contributory infringer. 52 Nevertheless, it held that the patent misuse
doctrine barred the plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief against
the defendant's contributory infringement. The Court ruled that the
patent was for the combination of its three elements only, and that the
individual elements of the combination were not protected by the
patent monopoly. It stated that there was no difference in principle
between supplies that were consumed in the operation of the patented
invention and an element that was an integral part of the patented
invention. 53 Accordingly, it overruled the Victor Talking Machine
case, which had recognized this distinction.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule the doctrine of
contributory infringement, however. Instead, it decided that the
defense of patent misuse barred a patentee from attempting to extend
the patent monopoly beyond the scope of the patent, and that the
scope of a combination patent was limited to the combination. The
Court concluded its discussion of contributory infringement and
patent misuse with the following:
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 497-98.
320 U.S. 661 (1944).
Id. at 664, 668.
Id. at 665.
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Where there is a collision between the principle of the Carbice
case and the conventional rules governing either direct or
contributory infringement, the former prevails.
The result of this decision, together with those which have
preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory
infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to
consider. It is sufficient to say that in whatever posture the issue
may be tendered courts of equity will withhold relief where the
patentee and those claiming under him are using the patent
privilege contrary to the public interest. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
54
Suppiger Co., supra,p. 492.
In a separate opinion, Justice Black approved of the result on the
ground that there was no statutory basis for the doctrine of
55
contributory infringement.
The Supreme Court also decided a companion case, Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,56 on the same day.
The original case was brought by the patentee against the alleged
contributory infringer, while the companion case was a declaratory
relief action brought by the alleged contributory infringer against the
exclusive licensee of the patent. The decision in the companion case
reinforced the Court's statement that it made no difference in
principle whether an unpatented element was an integral part of the
patented invention as far as patent misuse was concerned. The Court
explained:
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may
distinguish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a
patent. That may be done only in the manner provided by law.
However worthy it may be, however essential to the patent, an
unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to
57
monopolistic protection than any other unpatented device.
The Mercoid decisions caused consternation among the patent
bar. 58 While the doctrine of contributory infringement was still
recognized in a theoretical sense, it was always subject to being
trumped by the defense of patent misuse whenever relief for

54. Id. at 669.
55. Id. at 673 (Black, J., concurring).
56. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
57. Id. at 684.
58. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199 (1980) ("The
Mercoid decisions left in their wake some consternation among patent lawyers and a degree of
confusion in the lower courts." (citation omitted)).
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contributory infringement was sought. The effect of the Mercoid
decisions was to render combination patents, which comprise nearly
all patents, unenforceable whenever it was impractical to bring
individual actions against infringers who were widely dispersed.
Finding no sympathy from the Supreme Court, the patent bar went to
Congress to overrule the Mercoid decisions through legislation.
V. THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION

271

The bill that eventually became 35 U.S.C. § 271 was initially
drafted by a committee of the Patent Law Association of New York
that was chaired by Giles S. Rich, a prominent patent attorney who
later became a judge and served with great distinction on both the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and its successor, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 59 As finally enacted as part of the
recodification of Title 35 in the Patent Act of 1952,60 35 U.S.C. § 271
provided:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.

59. Hearings on H.R. 5988, 4061, and 5248 Before Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,80th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 21, at 3 (1948)
(statement of Giles Rich, primary draftsman of 5988). Judge Rich served on the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit until his death at the age of 95 in 1999. He has been recognized
as "the single most important figure in twentieth century intellectual property law." Patent and
Trademark Office Mourns Death of Judge Giles S. Rich, USPTO Press Release #99-14, June 10,
1999 (quoting Q. Todd Dickinson, a former Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/99-14.htm.
60. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792-814 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ I290 (2000)).
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(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived
revenue from acts which if performed by another without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights
against infringement or contributory infringement. 6 1
The Senate Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952
explained the purpose of § 271 as follows:
Section 271, paragraph (a), is a declaration of what constitutes
infringement in the present statute. It is not actually necessary
because the granting clause creates certain exclusive rights and
infringement would be any violation of those rights.
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) relate to the subject referred to as
contributory infringement. The doctrine of contributory
infringement has been part of our law for about 80 years. It has
been applied to enjoin those who sought to cause infringement by
supplying someone else with the means and directions for
infringing a patent. One who makes a special device constituting
the heart of a patented machine and supplies it to others with
directions (specific or implied) to complete the machine is
obviously appropriating the benefit of the patented invention. It is
for this reason that the doctrine of contributory infringement,
which prevents appropriating another man's patented invention,
has been characterized as "an expression both of law and morals."
Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory
infringement has resulted from a number of decisions of the courts
in recent years. The purpose of this section is to codify in statutory
form principles of contributory infringement and at the same time
eliminate this doubt and confusion. Paragraph (b) recites in broad
terms that one who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an
infringer. The principle of contributory infringement is set forth in
the provisions of the next paragraph which is concerned with the
usual situation in which contributory infringement arises. This
61. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (2001 & Supp. 2005)).
Section 271 has been amended numerous times since 1952. Subparagraphs (4) and (5) have been
added to paragraph (d), and new paragraphs (e)-(g) have been added. Paragraphs (b) and (c)
have not been amended, though. See Tom Arnold & Louis Riley, ContributoryInfringement and
Patent Misuse: The Enactment of § 271 and its Subsequent Amendments, J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y, 357, 378-83 (1994) (discussing the amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 271
through 1994).

386 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
latter paragraph is much more restricted than many proponents of
contributory infringement believe should be in [sic] the case. The
sale of a component of a patented machine, etc., must constitute a
material part of the invention and must be known to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in the infringement before there
can be contributory infringement, and likewise the sale of staple
articles of commerce suitable for noninfringement use does not
constitute contributory infringement. The last paragraph of this
section provides that one who merely does what he is authorized to
do by statute is not guilty of misuse of the patent. These
paragraphs have as their main purpose clarification and
62
stabilization.
Possibly because the statute was drafted by a committee of
patent lawyers, the structure of paragraphs (b) and (c) bears some
similarity to the independent and dependent claims of a patent.
Paragraph (c) covers the sale of a component of a patented invention
that has no substantial noninfringing use, and as noted in the Senate
Report above, it is intended to cover the usual situation in which
contributory infringement arises. Thus, contributory infringement
under paragraph (c) is limited to circumstances like those in Wallace
v. Holmes, where there is a sale of a component that has no
substantial use other than in an infringing combination. 63 No showing
of intent is required for liability under paragraph (c) if the defendant
sold a component of a patented invention that was a material part of
the invention and had no substantial noninfringing use, and in
addition, the defendant knew that the component was especially made
for use in infringing the patent.
The statute also imposes liability if the patentee offers evidence
that the defendant actively induced infringement. As in Wallace v.
Holmes, a defendant's intent to induce infringement might be inferred
from the circumstance that a component that the defendant sold had
no substantial noninfringing uses, but paragraph (b) also covers cases
where the defendant's actively inducing infringement is proved by
other evidence. Actively inducing infringement corresponds to the
second branch of the former judge-made doctrine of contributory
infringement as exemplified by such cases as Westinghouse Electric
& Mfg. Co. v Precise Mfg. Corp., where there was evidence that a
component with both infringing and noninfringing uses was sold with
64
the intent that it would be used to infringe a combination patent.
62. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
63. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
64. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926).
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Shortly after the Patent Act of 1952 went into effect, Judge Rich
published a law review article on the newly adopted 35 U.S.C. § 271
and its background. 65 After discussing the development of the
doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse, Judge Rich
emphasized the need for paragraph (d), which provides an exemption
from the doctrine of patent misuse for a patentee who is entitled to
relief under paragraphs (b) or (c). 66 Paragraph (d) legislatively
overruled the Mercoid cases, but Judge Rich added that it left intact
the Carbice holding concerning patent misuse since the patentee in
the Carbice case would not have been entitled to relief under
paragraphs (b) or (c). In other words, the statute makes a distinction
between the burner and the glass chimney in the Wallace case: the
patentee's rights would extend to the burner because the burner
constitutes the heart of the patented oil lamp, but they would not
extend to the glass chimney and the patent misuse doctrine would
continue to bar the patentee from attempting to extend the patent to
the glass chimney.
Judge Rich also noted that a significant difference between
paragraphs (b) and (c) was that paragraph (b) requires proof of active
inducement, which involves intent, while liability under paragraph (c)
requires only proof of its elements without any additional proof of
inducement or intent. 67 In addition, Judge Rich urged that paragraph
(b) should be construed so that the mere sale of staples would not be
sufficient by itself for the imposition of liability even if the sale was
made with the knowledge or expectation that the staples would be
used in infringement of a patent. He declined, however, to specify
precisely what showing was required for liability under paragraph (b),
stating that "problems will arise ... where the vendor's acts go

65. Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 521 (1953). Judge Rich's insights with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 271 are especially
significant because of his prominent role in its enactment. Besides chairing the committee that
drafted the proposed statute, Judge Rich testified at all of the hearings of the subcommittees of
the House Judiciary Committee that were held in 1948, 1949, and 1951 to consider the bills for
the proposed statute. See Hearings on H.R. 5988, 4061, and 5248 Before Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,80th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser.
21, 3-12 (1948); Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, 1-20 (1949); Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, 150-62 (1951). Judge
Rich's participation in the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271 is also described in Dawson Chem. Co.
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,206-12 (1980).
66. Rich, supra note 65, at 536.
67. Id. at 537-39.
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beyond mere selling. '68 Foreseeing issues that continue to arise today
(even in copyright law), Judge Rich made the following comments:
Suppose in advertising the product a use involving infringement is
suggested or advocated. Suppose that the sales force promotes such
uses. An infinite variety of promotional activities calculated to
result in infringement to a greater or less degree, can be envisaged.
The courts will have to solve the problems as they arise in the light
of the purpose of Section 271, which is to afford adequate
protection to valid patents against those who are clearly seeking to
benefit from piracy, especially in situations where enforcement
against direct infringers is impractical.69
The next section traces the case law developments with respect
to contributory infringement and actively inducing infringement in
patent law since the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271.
VI. INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT UNDER SECTION

271

One of the first cases to arise under 35 U.S.C. § 271 was
concerned with the requirement for contributory infringement in
paragraph (c) of knowledge on the part of a defendant that a
component it sold was especially made for use in the infringement of
a patent. Shortly after section 271 went into effect, the owner of a
patent for automobile convertible tops sued Aro, a maker of fabric
replacements for wornout convertible tops, for contributory
infringement with respect to the fabric replacements Aro made and
sold for use in both General Motors and Ford cars in the 1952-1954
model years. In the first case that went up to the Supreme Court, Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 1), the
Supreme Court decided that Aro was not liable for contributory
infringement because the car owners' replacement of the fabric in the
convertible tops constituted a permissible "repair," as opposed to an
infringing reconstruction, of the convertible tops, and therefore, there
70
was no direct infringement of the patent.
In the second case, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. (Aro I1), however, the Supreme Court ruled that its
decision in Aro I dealt only with the General Motors cars, and not
with the Ford cars. 7 1 Unlike General Motors, Ford had not obtained a
license from the owner of the patent. Consequently, Ford's
68. Id. at 542.
69. Id.
70. 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro I).
71. 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro I1).
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manufacture and sale of its cars with convertible tops infringed the
patent, and the car owner's replacement of the fabric in the infringing
convertible tops likewise constituted direct infringement. Even though
the Supreme Court ruled in Aro H that there was direct infringement
on account of the car owner's repair of the convertible tops for the
Ford cars, the majority of the Court nevertheless determined that Aro
would not necessarily be liable as a contributory infringer. 72 Focusing
on the language in paragraph (c) that contributory infringement
required sale of a component of a patented combination "knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent," the Court held that there must be a
showing that an alleged infringer not only knew of the patent, but also
that the use of the component would infringe the patent. 73 Thus, Aro
would be liable for contributory infringement only for sales of its
fabric replacements after it became aware that Ford was not licensed
under the patent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case
for a determination of when Aro became aware that use of its fabric
replacements on Ford cars was infringing.
While the Aro cases were concerned with contributory
infringement under paragraph (c) of section 271, most of the cases
that have arisen since the statute's enactment have dealt with the ways
in which liability under paragraph (b) may be established. As Judge
Rich predicted, 74 liability for inducing infringement has been
predicated on a variety of promotional activities, including
advertising infringing uses of the defendant's products, 7 5 and
79
providing demonstrations, 76 training, 77 articles, 7 8 instructions,
72. See id.
73. Id. at 488.
74. See supratext accompanying note 69.
75. See, e.g., Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (advertisements); Snuba Int'l, Inc. v. Dolphin World, Inc., 250 F.3d 761,
2000 WL 961363, at *7 (Fed. Cir) (unpublished table decision) (sales information and
promotional materials included directions for use in an infringing manner); Chisum v. Brewco
Sales & Mfg., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1499, 1513 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (sales brochure instructions as to
product's sole use for infringement).
76. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (demonstrations to customers and distributors).
77. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(training customers to use the infringing method).
78. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (publication of articles targeted to customers that promote infringement).
79. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(supplying infringing products with instructions on how they were to be used to infringe);
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (instruction sheet
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labeling on products, 80 or data sheets 81 that explain how the
defendant's products may be used to infringe a patent. In addition,
liability for inducing infringement has been based on the exercise of
control over a third party's direct infringement 82 and on agreements to
83
indemnify customers against patent infringement claims.
The leading case involving active inducement of infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) is probably Hewlett-PackardCo. v. Bausch
& Lomb Inc., in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
held that proof of actual intent was required for liability. 84 The
patentee alleged that a division of the defendant that the defendant
had sold had infringed its patent. The patentee charged the defendant
with direct infringement for the period before the sale and with
actively inducing infringement under paragraph (b) for the period
after the sale during which the infringement by the division
continued. The Federal Circuit decided that although the defendant
was liable for direct infringement, the defendant was not liable for
inducing infringement because there was no proof that the defendant
intended to induce infringement by the division after the division's
sale. The court reasoned as follows:
On its face, § 271(b) is much broader than § 271(c) and certainly
does not speak of any intent requirement to prove active
inducement. However, in view of the very definition of "active
inducement" in pre-1952 case law and the fact that § 271(b) was
intended as merely a codification of pre-1952 law, we are of the
opinion that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which
taught how to solve patented puzzle); Sing v. Culture Prods., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1249, 1255
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (method of use set forth in the instructions resulted in infringement); Johnson
& Johnson v. W. L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704, 727 n.41 (D. Del. 1977)
(instructions on packaging and advertising materials).
80. R2 Med. Sys. Inc. v. Katecho, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1397, 1440-41 (N.D. I11.1996)
(labeling on components indicated their use to infringe the patented system).
81. VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 130 F. Supp. 2d 178, 200 (D. Mass. 2001) (data sheets
for integrated circuits provided detailed description of how to use chips in infringing devices).
82. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (control exerted
by owner of trademark for infringing product through licensing agreements); Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("corporate officers who
actively assist with their corporation's infringement may be personally liable for inducing
infringement regardless of whether the circumstances are such that a court should disregard the
corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil") (emphasis in original); SunTiger, Inc. v.
Scientific Research Funding Group, 194 F.3d 1335, 1999 WL 379140 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision) (control of product development under contract with advertiser);
Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. I11.1989).
83. H.B. Fuller Co. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 689 F. Supp. 923, 945 (D. Minn.
1988); Sing v. Culture Prods., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
84. 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding
85
active inducement.
Although the Federal Circuit ultimately found that there was no
showing of an intent to induce infringement, the court was troubled
by an indemnification clause in the agreement for the sale of the
division, which provided that the defendant would indemnify the
purchaser if the division's product was found to have infringed the
plaintiff's patent. The Federal Circuit noted that cases had held that an
intent to induce infringement could be inferred from an
indemnification clause when the primary purpose was to overcome
the deterrent effect of the patent laws. It concluded, however, that the
purpose of the indemnification clause in the case before it was to
obtain the highest sales price for the division, rather than to induce
86
infringement after the sale.
Direct evidence of a defendant's "actual intent to cause the acts
which constitute the infringement" is usually not available in the
absence of admissions by the defendant. Thus, as in other legal
contexts, proof of intent will usually be by inference from
87
circumstantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit has recently acknowledged a lack of clarity 88
as to whether the required intent is to merely cause the infringing acts
to occur (as stated supra in the quotation from the Hewlett-Packard
case) 89 or the required intent is to cause an infringement. The Federal
Circuit's lack of clarity is the result of an intra-circuit conflict within
the Federal Circuit (which was established to avoid inter-circuit
conflicts in patent law) between Hewlett-Packardand Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,90 which was decided several

85. Id.
86. Id. at 1470.
87. See Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("A patentee may prove intent through circumstantial evidence."); Insituform Techs., Inc.
v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Intent is a factual determination
particularly within the province of the trier of fact and may be inferred from all the
circumstances); Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("While
proof of intent is necessary, direct evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence may
suffice.").
88. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369,
1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mereexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
89. See supra text accompanying note 85.
90. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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months later. The plaintiff in the Manville case charged the defendant
corporation with direct infringement and two of its officers with
inducing infringement on account of their control over the defendant
corporation. The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling that
the officers were liable for inducing infringement on the grounds that
there was neither compelling evidence nor any findings that the
officers had the specific intent to cause the corporation to infringe the
plaintiffs patent. The Federal Circuit held:
The alleged infringer must be shown, however, to have knowingly
induced infringement. [Citation omitted]. It must be established
that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another's
infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of
the acts alleged to constitute inducement. The plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the alleged infringer's actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions
91
would induce actual infringements.
The Federal Circuit ruled that the trial court's finding of inducement
of infringement was negated by the fact that the corporate officers
were not aware of the plaintiffs patent until after the suit was filed,
and that the corporation's subsequent infringement of the patent was
the result of the officers' good faith belief, based on advice of
counsel, that the corporation's product did not infringe.
The differences between the Hewlett-Packard and Manville
cases may be more apparent than real. It was unnecessary for the
Federal Circuit in Hewlett-Packardto address whether the defendant
knew or should have known that its actions would induce
infringement because the court decided that the defendant was not
liable for inducing infringement on account of the defendant's lack of
intent to induce the acts constituting infringement. Therefore, the
Hewlett-Packardand Manville cases can be reconciled by interpreting
them as requiring that the defendant must have both intended to
induce the acts that constituted infringement and also known or
should have known that those acts would induce infringements.
While the Federal Circuit has noted a lack of clarity with respect
to the intent requirements in the Hewlett-Packard and Manville
decisions in four recent cases, in each of the cases it nevertheless has
found it unnecessary to resolve the discrepancy because it ruled that
the outcomes would be the same regardless of which intent
requirement was used. In Insituform Technologies, Inv. v. Cat

91.

Id. at 553,
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Contracting, Inc.,92 the Federal Circuit decided that there was

sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of inducement
of infringement under either the Hewlett-Packard or Manville
standards. The court based its decision on evidence in the record that
the defendants had full knowledge that the process they were
licensing to their customers had been accused of infringing the
plaintiffs patent. Similarly, in MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi MaterialsSilicon Corp.,93 the Federal Circuit decided that
the defendant's intent to cause an infringement could be presumed
from the defendant's knowledge of the patent if the plaintiff could
prove that the defendant had the intent to induce the specific acts
constituting an infringement. Moreover, in Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd.
v. Jazz Photo Corp.,94 the Federal Circuit decided that substantial
evidence supported the trial court's finding of inducement of
infringement under either standard, because the defendant was aware
of the plaintiff's contentions regarding infringement. In
Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,95 however, the Federal Circuit
decided that there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding of inducement of infringement under either standard,
because the defendant had no knowledge of any acts of infringement.
While Manville and the other cases spoke of a discrepancy with
respect to the intent requirement, they were all decided on the basis of
whether the defendants had knowledge of either the existence of the
patent, the plaintiffs contentions that it was being infringed, or the
alleged acts of infringement. A defendant's knowledge and intent are
closely linked. In the Manville and Mercexchange cases, the
defendants' lack of knowledge of the patent negated their intent to
induce infringement. Conversely, in the Insituform, MEMC, and Fuji
Photo cases, the defendants' knowledge of the plaintiffs' accusations
of infringement supplied the basis for an inference of their intent to
induce infringement. 96 Although a showing of knowledge may
provide a basis for inferring an intent to induce infringement, intent
does not necessarily follow from knowledge. For example, in the
Hewlett-Packardcase, the indemnification provision established that
the defendant had knowledge of the patent and the prospect that the
92. 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
93. 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
94. 394 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
95. 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005).
96. See also SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward, 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
("If a defendant knows about a patent yet continues to sell the infringing product, a reasonable
jury can find the defendant liable under § 271 (b).").
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buyer might infringe the patent; nevertheless the Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the defendant did not have
the intent to infringe the patent.
In Aro II, the Supreme Court decided that liability for
contributory infringement required proof that the defendant knew
both that there was a patent and that the product it sold would be used
to infringe the patent. 97 The Federal Circuit has already ruled that
liability for inducing infringement requires proof that the defendant
knew that there was a patent. 98 Proving that the defendant knew that
its product would be used for infringement of the patent may be
considerably more difficult, because it would appear to require proof
that the defendant not only knew how the product would be used but
also knew that the patent was valid and infringed by the use. Since it
is possible to challenge the validity of almost any patent and the issue
of infringement is often unclear, proof the defendant was aware of a
reasonably serious accusation of infringement ought to be sufficient
for liability for actively inducing infringement, as the Federal Circuit
decided in the Insituform and Fuji Photo cases. Exactly how the
Federal Circuit will articulate the requirements for active inducement
of infringement in future cases remains to be seen, however.
The next section examines the application of 35 U.S.C. § 271 to
the contributory infringement and active inducement of infringement
of copyrights.
VII. APPLICATION

OF SECTION

271

TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 271 shows clearly that the
statute was enacted for reasons that were peculiar to patent law.99 As
a result of the Mercoid decisions, the doctrine of contributory
infringement that had developed since 1871 was jeopardized by the
doctrine of patent misuse, and § 271 was adopted to codify the
doctrine of contributory infringement in patent law. Although there is
no hint that § 271 was ever intended to apply to copyrights, the
Supreme Court nevertheless has decided as a practical matter that the
statute governs copyright law as well as patent law.
97. See supra text accompanying note 73.
98. See Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.,161 F.3d 688, 695 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("A crucial element of induced infringement is that the inducer must have actual or constructive
knowledge of the patent."). See also Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 1152, 1165-66 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("A finding of actual knowledge of the patent is
clearly a prerequisite to finding that an accused infringer 'actively induced' infringement of that
same patent.").
99. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
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The Supreme Court first applied the principles in § 271 to
copyright cases in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.100 The Supreme Court noted that in contrast to the Patent Act, the
Copyright Act did not expressly impose liability for infringement
committed by another person. It continued that the absence of an
express provision in the copyright statute did not preclude the
imposition of liability on persons who did not themselves engage in
copyright infringement, however. 10 1
The Sony Court gave Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers10 2 as an
example of a case where liability for contributory infringement of a
copyright had been imposed. The Court concluded, however, that the
Kalem case did not support imposing liability for contributory
infringement on Sony. The contributory infringer in Kalem had an
ongoing relationship with the direct infringers while the infringement
was occurring-so that it was able to exercise control over their use
of the copyrighted work-and it authorized the use of the copyrighted
work without permission from the copyright owners. In contrast, there
was no ongoing relationship between Sony and the consumers who
03
purchased its videotape recorders. 1
Finding no basis for imposing liability on Sony under the Kalem
case, the Supreme Court then turned to patent law "because of the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law." 1 04 In a
footnote, the Supreme Court explained that it had consistently
rejected the proposition that a similar relationship existed between
copyright law and trademark law. The Court then described the
narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement as being
limited to circumstances where a manufacturer or distributor
intentionally induced a merchant to infringe a trademark or continued
to supply a product to one whom it knew or had reason to know was
engaging in trademark infringement. The Court explained that if the
narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement was applied,
the claim against Sony for contributory copyright infringement would
merit little discussion. It stated: "Sony certainly does not
'intentionally induce[]' its customers to make infringing uses of
respondents' copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 435.
222 U.S. 55 (1911).
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 439.
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individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of
105
respondents' copyrights."'
After this cursory reference to inducing infringement, the Court
went on to discuss at length contributory infringement by analogy to §
271(c). The Court ultimately concluded that Sony was not liable for
contributory copyright infringement because the videotape recorders
it sold were capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 106 The Sony
Court evidently found that it was unnecessary to address Sony's
potential liability for inducing infringement using an analogy to §
271(b) because of the conclusion in its footnote that Sony did not
intentionally induce its customers to infringe the copyrights on the
107
television programs that the plaintiffs owned.
Ever since the Wallace decision in 1871, liability for
contributory infringement in patent law has been based on an intent to
cause infringement by third persons. While this intent was often
inferred from a defendant's making or selling products with no
substantial noninfringing uses, it could also be inferred from the
defendant's advertising or other conduct that promoted infringing
uses of products that also had noninfringing uses. When the doctrine
of contributory infringement was codified in § 271, liability for
inducing infringement was included in paragraph (b) along with
liability for contributory infringement in paragraph (c), and the Senate
Report accompanying the legislation explained that contributory
infringement under paragraph (c) was intended to be a special case of
inducing infringement under paragraph (b). 10 8 Thus, it would have
been peculiar for the Supreme Court to have incorporated the
principles of contributory infringement in paragraph (c) into copyright
law without also incorporating the principles of inducement of
infringement. Accordingly, it should have come as no great surprise
that the Supreme Court would apply the principles of inducement of

105. Id. at 439 n.19 (internal citation omitted).
106. Id at 456.
107. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777
(2005) ("[W]ith no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote infringing uses, the only
conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement arising
from [Sony's] sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use them to
infringe.").
108. S. Rep. No. 82-1979, supra note 62 ("Paragraph (b) recites in broad terms that one
who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an infringer. The principle of contributory
infringement is set forth in the provisions of the next paragraph which is concerned with the
usual situation in which contributory infringement arises.").
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infringement to copyright law in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
09
v. Grokster.1
The Supreme Court expressed its holding in the Grokster case as
follows:
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of
patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the
inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it
here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.1 10
The Supreme Court went on to limit the scope of liability for inducing
infringement by excluding cases where a distributor merely had
knowledge of potential or actual copyright infringement or provided
customer support. The Court stated: "mere knowledge of infringing
potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to
subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to
product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or
product updates, support liability in themselves."' 111 The Court then
examined the evidence that had been presented of the defendants'
objective in distributing their software products and concluded: "The
unlawful objective is umnistakable." 112 The Court therefore reversed
the summary judgment for the defendants, finding that there was
substantial evidence of inducement of infringement, and remanded for
reconsideration of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Whether the patent law principles of contributory infringement
and inducement of infringement belong in copyright law is
questionable. Certainly, there is nothing in the legislative history of §
271 that suggests that the statute was intended to be applicable to
copyright law. Moreover, the contexts in which indirect infringement
claims arise in patent law differ from the contexts in copyright law.
Indirect infringement in patent law typically arises when an alleged
infringer copies nearly, but not quite, all of the elements of a
combination product claim in a specific patent, or else makes a
product that can be used to perform a specific patented process. In
contrast, indirect infringement in copyright law often will not be
associated with a specific copyrighted work, but instead will arise
109.
110.
111.
112.

125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
Id. at 2780.
Id.
Idat2782.
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from the development of technology that is capable of violating one
or more of the exclusive rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106, such as making or
distributing copies of copyrighted works or performing or displaying
copyrighted works publicly. Thus, a developer of technology that can
be used for copyright infringement may be exposed to open-ended
liability for indirect infringement, while liability for indirect
infringement in patent law will generally be limited to a specific
patent.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declared that the patent law
principles of both contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement are applicable to copyright law.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The doctrines of contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement have had a bumpy ride over their 130-year lifetime.
From its humble origins in the Wallace decision, the doctrine of
contributory infringement expanded rapidly as creative patentees
ingeniously sought to extend their patent monopolies to corner
additional markets. Congress responded by enacting the Clayton Act,
but even this was not enough to curb the abuses that arose out of the
doctrine of contributory infringement. And so, the Supreme Court
developed the patent misuse doctrine, which succeeded in reining in
the doctrine of contributory infringement only by essentially
destroying it. Congress resurrected contributory infringement in the
Patent Act of 1952. Even after being codified, the precise extent of
the branch of contributory infringement that is now known as
inducement of infringement remains unclear, as it has produced an
intra-circuit conflict within the Federal Circuit that the Federal Circuit
has noted in four cases but has yet to resolve. Nevertheless, the
doctrines of contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement are stronger than ever, having been extended by the
Supreme Court to cover copyright infi-ngement through the use of
VCR's and file sharing on the Internet.

